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In 1992, Kenya held the first multi-party élections since the de
facto jringle-party élections of 1969. Church leaders had started
campaigning for the return of the multi-party system in the
beginning of 1990. Politicians, NGOs and the Kenyan public at
large followed their example. Even more important, by
November 1991 the international donor Community also openly
pressed for political as well as economie reforms and threat-
ened to withhold aid. The following month President Daniel
arap Moi announced the withdrawal of section 2(A) of the
Constitution, making Kenya a de jure multi-party state again.
New political parties were launched. finally, on 29 December
1992 Kenya followed the footsteps of Zambia, which had,
among the English-speaking African countries, heralded the
transition from single to multi-party politics in October 1991
(see Andreassen et al. 1992).
The Kenyan 1992 élections were characterized by widespread
allégations of irregularities, such as the stuffing of ballot boxes,
destroying of opposition votes and count-rigging (see Barkan
1993; Mulei 1996; NEMU 1993; Weekly Review 1993; Africa
Confidential 1993). Local observer groups had united in the
National Electoral Monitoring Unit (NEMU). They trained and
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deployed some 8,000 domestic observers throughout thé
country.
The international community observed thé élections in thé
usual way: élection observers from all over the world were flown
in some days before élection day (29 December) and left shortly
afterwards. The two most important outside teams were thé
Washington-based International Republican Institute and thé
Commonwealth team. In addition, national délégations from
Denmark, Egypt, Germany, Japan and Switzerland were sent.
Still, there were fewer than 200 international observers for
7,000 polling stations. Coordination of efforts by thé foreign
missions was minimal (see Afnca Confidential 1992). Also,
'Neither thé foreign nor the local observers groups had the
capacity or resources to investigate comprehensively rigging
allégations. Consequently they reported only the most blatant
and easily verifiable irregularities' (Africa Confidential 1993).
Accusations of 'élection tourism' were also made (see Geisler
1993: 615). In préparation for thé observation of the 1997 élec-
tions, it was thereupon concluded by the donor community that
a more cohérent and thorough approach was needed to reach
an objective overall judgement concerning thé way élections are
conducted.
THE CREATION OF THE ELECTION OBSERVATION
CENTRE
In thé months of May and June 1997, member states of the
DDDG (Donors for Development and Democracy Group) - 24
Western donors' - held a number of meetings and decided to
install an Election Observation Centre (EOC). This small sec-
rétariat was to coordinate ail activities by and for thé DDDG
member states' représentations in Nairobi.2 Its major purpose
was to provide information to thé DDDG missions concerning
élection rules, constituencies to be visited and what to observe,
and to coordinate the travel plans of the DDDG missions.
The Western donors made funds available for a mission to
design thé EOC and to provide a workplan. The main bottle-
neck was the uncertainty regarding the date of the élection. In
principle it should have been held in 1997, five years after the
1992 élections and at the end of President Moi's first term. The
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élections could be held within a period of some two months
after thé président decided to dissolve parliament. As a resuit,
the donor group needed to prépare themselves for observing
thé élections somewhere between August 1997 and April 1998.3
The main rationale for collaboration was to avoid a duplica-
tion of efforts. Another element was dissatisfaction with thé
traditional, short-term élection observation by hastily prepared
teams of international observers. Moreover, it had become more
clear in récent years that an élection is more than polling day:
it includes many phases such as thé issuance of ID cards, regis-
tration of voters and nomination of candidates. Also, informa-
tion concerning thé élection process provided by thé relevant
authorities and média in Kenya lacked credibility. A need was
feit among donor-country représentatives to look for an alterna-
tive model for élection observation. The Dutch took thé lead and con-
vened a meeting on 28 May to discuss thé création and ternis of
référence for a 'DDDG Election Observation Secrétariat'.
Interested parties were Denmark, USA, thé EU commission
and thé UK. Except for thé latter, all showed their immédiate
willingness to combine both funds and personnel in thé estab-
lishment of a secrétariat.4 It was decided that a next step would
be to décide on what resources would be required for thé secré-
tariat to function properly and under which précise conditions.
In July, two consultants, Marguerite Garling (EU) and Judith
Geist (USAID), provided a proposai for thé set up and opéra-
tion of the Diplomatie Election Observation Secrétariat. Three
models for élection observation were discussed: a) 'Do-it-
Yourself'; b) small coordinating Secrétariat; c) UN coordinated
formai observation.
In thé first model the missions would gather information by
themselves. At best they would pool their observers and share
thé information collected. In the third model, observation
would be along the traditional lines. A UN-supplied coordinat-
ing team would run an independent office and provide a füll
range of services to thé diplomatie community. This option was
considered to be a rather inflexible, costly and unsatisfactory
one. Thus, in thé end, it was recommended to embrace thé
second rnodel, for two main reasons: 1) some DDDG members
had indicated that staff resources were limited and that addi-
tional observer capacity would be welcomed, and 2) thé UN
option would take too much time to establish and fund a well
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functioning unit, while thé élections were near. finally, expéri-
ence had shown that a UN unit would hâve difficulties in craft-
mg a joint verdict on the process and outcome of the élections.
The structure, functioning and necessary resources of Model
2 were outlined by Garling and Geist as follows: the resources
to run it should be acquired from individual diplomatie mis-
sions. It was proposed to contract a coördinator with overall
supervision, liaison and public relations responsibilities; an in-
formation and analysis officer; three or four research assistants;
and an office manager. The secrétariat should assist in thé pro-
duction of observation forms, news summaries, briefing mater-
ial, and a deployment strategy as well as with actual field
observation. This intermediate model between 'Diplomats Do-
It-Yourself and 'UN Stand Alone' was somehow drawn on a
model employed in the Ethiopian 1995 élections, but foremost a
new experiment.
By earlyjuly it became clear that thé UN had no intention of
setting up a UN électoral Unit during Kenya's 1997 General
Elections. This position was explained to the DDDG by a UN
représentative. He also stressed thé need to support local ob-
servers. The UN was considering several options in this respect
and was pleased to learn that the donors intended to provide
financial assistance to domestic groups. That same meeting thé
donors accepted thé consultants' proposai almost in füll length
except for thé hierarchical structure of the Election
Observation Centre. Instead they opted to divide responsibil-
ities between at least three to four coördinators. As indicated by
the donors in thé Ternis of Référence to these coördinators, the
main tasks of the EOG were to:
• Gollect and analyse material concerning élection rules
and régulations, constituencies and thé location of polling
stations;
• Monitor local newspapers and Journals;
• Liaise with thé diplomatie missions of the DDDG;
• Provide advice to thé DDDG missions on which constituen-
cies would merit visits and guidance on what to observe;
• Produce checklists for diplomatie observers, for each phase
of the élection period;
0 Coordinate observer travel plans;
• Maintain and distribute records of observer reports;
S i.
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• Goordinate travel planning of the DDDG missions;
* Maintain close contact with domestic observer organizations,
other international observer teams, if any, and with thé
political parties;
, * Maintain close contact with thé Electoral Commission.
The EOC was not conceived as a formal entity in its own right,
but rather as a tool that thé DDDG used to gain a maximum
; amount of shared information while economizing on diplomatie
: time spent in official efforts to obtain such. EOC members were
to refrain from making public or press Statements. At the same
time the EOC needed to be transparent about its intentions
and working methods to thé Electoral Commission of Kenya,
the political parties, the domestic observers and the civil society
actors at large.
KENYA'S 1997 GENERAL ELECTIONS: THE CONTEXT
The context of the 1997 General Election in Kenya could be
characterized as one of rising tension since the beginning of
that year. Cabinet reshuffles resulted in the return of certain
ministers known to be 'hard-liners' while other, more modest
and reform-oriented ministers left. Opposition parties, civil
society groups and religieus institutions combined efforts and
intensified their calls for the abolition of certain repressive laws
ànd for constitutional reforms to create a (more) level playing
field before the 1997 General Elections. For this purpose the so-
called National Constitutive Assembly was created and had its
first Plenary Session in Limuru on 6 April 1997. In the following
months its executive arm, the National Convention Executive
Committee (NCEC) organized and channelled mass protests to
an extent that the government seriously feit threatened. The
clashes along the coast which erupted in August and
September, whereby especially non-KANU groups became
victims of attacks thought to be organized and instigated by
(local) KANU-politicians, further deteriorated the situation. It
has been claimed that this tragedy was part of an initial phase
of a larger state-sponsored plan to undermine the constitutional
reform movement.5 However, international protests and
ongoing national pressure finally resulted in the adoption of a
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minimal reform package through thé Inter-Parties Parhamentary
Group (IPPG). Though cnticized by some sections of the opposi-
tion, this package enabled the restoration of a more calm envir-
onment. For example, freedom of political démonstrations and
gatherings was allowed, and Safina (a new opposition party)
after a long period of delay and uncertainty, finally registered.
It was against this background that Kenyans voted on
29 December 1997 for a new five-year period of local and parlia-
mentary government and for thé Presidency.
ACTIVITIES PERFORMED BY THE EOC
By thé end of October 1997 the British coördinator arrived and
started to prépare thé Election Observation Centre (EOG) for
opération. He met with a large number of diplomatie missions,
Kenyan politicians, domestic observer groups and civil society
NGOs, and arranged practical issues such as financing, housing,
equipment, collection of élection profiles, and relevant docu-
mentation from back-issues of newspapers and weekly maga-
zines. By thé second half of November the EOC started to
become fully operational. All coördinators had arrived and thé
coordination of élection observation by thé 24 DDDG missions
was fully put into practice. Within thé EOC spécifie tasks were
attributed to the coördinators and staff members, as shown in
Table 13.1.
The 1997 Kenyan élections can be subdivided into five dis-
tinctive phases:
1. Registration of voters (conducted from 22 May to 3 July
1997);
2. Internai political party élections to décide on their candi-
dates ('party primaries') (late November—early December);
3. A two-day period for officially nominating thèse candidates
to thé Kenyan Electoral Commission (2—3 December
presidential and 8—9 December local and parhamentary
candidates);
4. The campaign period (10-28 December); and
5. Election day (including counting of the votes), 29 December
and following days.
ti
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Note NEP — Northeastern Province
Registration of Voters
Before the official start of thé EOC its coördinators witnessed
thé voter registration process in some 25 districts. An évalu-
ation of voter registration concluded that up to two million
young Kenyans between thé âges of 18 and 23 had not been
issued with their National Identity Cards and thus were denied
thé right to exercise their franchise.
Registration of voters started on 22 May 1997 and was sup-
posed to last 35 days. The exercise started with controversy
over the use of old and new identity cards (Economie Review
1997: 30). Allégations were made that in certain areas people
were denied registration on the basis of ethnicity (see Economie
Review 1997a: 20). In other constituencies (for example, Nairobi
Westlands) very high rates of registration were recorded or ini-
tially wrong voter cards issued (Luo districts of Nyanza
Province). Faced with numbers far below the target, the
Electoral Commission chairman, Mr Chesoni, extended the
voter registration period by a paltry two days and then grudg-
ingly added another few days, with 3 July being thé final day.
finally slightly over 9 million people registered.
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Party Primaries
Deployment plans and checklists for observation of the party
primaries were ready by the end of November. Detailed infor-
mation on each constituency had been collected from news-
papers, weekly magazines and knowledgeable individuals. It
was used in thé analysis for determining which constituencies
needed priority in thé observation exercise. All of this informa^
tion was provided to thé diplomatie observers in a meeting où
24 November. Représentatives of domestic observer groupa
were also present at this meeting. They shared their knowledge
and expériences with the donor Community.
Mainly the British, Dutch and Ganadian diplomats observée}
the party primaries. Based on reports for KANU, DP, NDP and
Ford-K primaries from some 24 districts, the EOG produced a
short report, which was presented to thé DDDG. It was con-
cluded that in général thé primary process was done fairly simi-
larly to thé one in 1992. Some 2 million Kenyans participated in
thé sélection of their parties' candidates. Among thé main
différences, though, was the less important rôle played by
thé Provincial Administration. Problems were greatest in
urban areas. Notwithstanding this observation, and despite vio-
lence in Likoni, and along the Trans Mara-Kisii border, thé
November-December 1997 party primaries were conducted in
an environment much less constrained by ethnie violence than
in 1992.
Nomination of Parliamentary and Civic Candidates
After the party primaries a detailed 'plan of action' was pro-
duced by thé EOC to streamline thé activities and division of
labour. Nomination observation forms were produced and
handed out, together with constituency profiles, and other rel-
evant information, to thé international observers. Certain con-
stituencies had been ear-marked as potential problem areas
needing observation. On 8 and 9 December, some 11 Western
missions participated in thé observations. Over 50 observers
visited a similar number of constituencies. Again Dutch, British
and Ganadian observers provided the bulk of the observers.
Observation forms had to be returned to thé Centre by
10 December. If serious incidents happened contact was to be
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î;made with thé EOC. The EOC received complaints by political
•parties about problems in Siaya and Nandi areas; diplomatie
\0Jjservers and the EOC made checks in those districts. The
1 ,-DDDG Chair contacted thé Electoral Commission of Kenya
- and summarized thé international observers' concerns for
' Nandi, where opposition parliamentary and civic candidates
''„Vfjfre denied clearance of their nomination papers. In the end,
'"*oo cases of candidates being bar red from the nomination
process were reported for this area. In contrast to 1992, thé
' nomination process on 8 and 9 December was more peaceful
" aîid conducted in greater accordance with thé régulations. Most
nomination centres opened on time and were efficiently organ-
ized. This time problems seem to hâve corne from interférence
by party headquarters. Sometimes at the last moment attempts
were made to replace the official candidate by another person
(such as in thé case of KANU in Kajiado Central and South
'constituencies).
The Campaign Period
On 10 December the Kenyan général élections 1997 campaign
period officially started. The EOC informed ail missions in
préparation for thé campaign observation and handed out cam-
paign rally checklists and information packages. Deployment
plans for thé period up to 21 December were distributed on
15 December. It also indicated areas where thé EOC would like
to send diplomatie observers.
The EOC collected détails on campaign programmes for thé
political parties. This was hard to obtain, and mainly restricted
to thé presidential candidates. Likewise, dates, venues and
times could easily change. This hampered thé observation of
thé campaign period. Besides, thé ability to hold political rallies
and access to thé média are an important aspect of observation.
From July 1997 thé Kenya Human Rights Commission (KHRC)
in partnership with 'Article 19' (thé International Centre
Against Censorship, based in London) monitored thé (state-
owned) Kenya Broadcasting Corporation (KBC) radio and télé-
vision coverage of political activity in thé period leading up to
thé 1997 General Election. KHRC published monthly reports in
both a quantitative (air-time for political parties) as well as
qualitative sensé (négative/positive) (see KHRC and Article 19).
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During thé months of July, August and October, coverage
KANU and President Moi took up more than 80 to 90 per cent
of KBC télévision and radio reports. By contrast,-its coverage of
the opposition was some 5-10 per cent only - and mostly nega-;
tive. Following the IPPG reforms in early November and the
subséquent amendment of the Kenyan Broadcasting Act, re-
quiring KBC to maintain a fair balance in allocating air-time,
between the different parties, the time allocated to the opposi-
tion increased dramatically, rising from 10 to 32 per cent in the
last week. However, 96 per cent of opposition coverage in week
four was negative. From the start of the official campaign
onwards, KBC Télévision and radio returned to giving a dispro-
portionate amount of time to KANU and President Moi.
Coverage of the opposition parties and candidates was much
more equal in the print media. Journalists were permitted to
record the process and to take photographs. International ob-'
servers witnessed their présence on the nomination days and
during the campaign period.
International observers witnessed bribery and intimidation of
minority party supporters in many constituencies throughout
the élection period. Nevertheless, in genera! the électoral
process was considered more peaceful than in 1992. So-called
KANU zones, constituencies declared to be 'no-go' areas by
KANU politicians, were more or less absent this time. In oppo-
sition areas threats were mainly directed at KANU activists.
Few opposition meetings were prohibited or interfered with by
the Provincial Administration or police. There were exceptions,
however, including thé use of tear gas against opposition
presidential candidates and life threats to, among others,
Mr Kandie, the opponent to Président Moi (see Andreassen
1998). Female candidates in particular complained that they
were singled out for attacks purely on the basis of their gender.
Voting Day
Towards 19 December, the workload at the centre reached its
maximum levels. Because of public holidays in thé week before
thé General Election Day thé time-span to finalize thé deploy-
ment plan, prépare the field Guidance Manual and thé
'Observation Kit', and organize an instruction meeting with ail
observers was minimal.
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The Diplomatic Election Observers field Guidance contained
: genera! gmdelines for observers (for example, code of ethics,
jiealings with the press, security) and gave detailed information
jçoncerning the Kenyan électoral process (for example, élection
•rules, voting and counting procédures and irregularities). It
also included élection observation forms, investigation and re-
fporting guidelines. The EOC had made arrangements for thé
• observers to immediately report to thé Centre on 29 December
-if serious incidents occured. The 'Observation Kit' contained,
, among others things, constituency profiles, map of the area,
' iJsts of returning officers, Electoral Commissioners, district
électoral coördinators, polling stations and team deployment
détails. Also included were the official Electoral Commission of
Kenya Election Manual, IED Election Observer (Training)
Manual, vehicle posters, an international observers T-shirt and
Electoral Commission of Kenya observer badges. Observers
also carried a letter of accréditation. On 19 December all inter-
national observers were instructed. That same day the DDDG
also informed thé international press of their plans for thé ob-
servation of thé élections. By 24 December all materials had
been handed out to the diplomatie missions.
- Most diplomats left one or two days before 29 December, so
as to witness the opening of the polling stations, scheduled at
6.00 a.m. However, thé distribution of ballot papers was flawed
at three stages: first, from the printers in Britain, secondly,
from the central stores of the Electoral Commission in Kenya;
and finally by returning officers in many constituencies.7 As
a resuit many polling stations opened late. The Electoral
Commission, in an attempt to overcome this problem, extended
the poll to Tuesday 30 December. Unfortunately, this announce-
ment came rather late and was contradictory, creating considér-
able confusion in many areas.
The Count
The count of the Kenya 1997 élections started on 30 December
and was donc at constituency level in a central counting hall.
There were too few counting officials and the count took far too
long: in certain areas up to a week. Still, the count was con-
ducted in a fair and transparent manner in most constituencies,
and intimidation and/or rigging were witnessed or are
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suspected to have taken place in about 15 constituencies.
Incidents reported mclude attempts to smuggle filled ballot
papers into thé counting hall; arrivai of ballot boxes after thé
count had begun, usually without party seals or agents; count-
ing clerks caught attempting to spoil ballot papers; deputy re-
turning officers kidnapped; and thé mishandling of empty ballot
papers in thé possession of Commission officials. The EOC co-
ördinators witnessed in person particular serious irregularities
at thé count of Westlands constituency. Among thé problems
observed were interférence by State House officials; change of
final resuit in favour of thé KANU candidate for parliament;
refusai of a recount; attempts by thé élection officials to remove
the ballot boxes without sealing them; and opening all the
boxes and intermingling of ballots from different polling sta-
tions to reduce thé number of ballot boxes. It was claimed that
thé latter was donc on thé instruction of the Electoral
Commission because of lack of storage capacity.8 In conclusion,
especially with référence to this case, thé idea of having a small
secrétariat with observing capacity worked very well.
Reporting thé Observations
While following thé Westlands situation closely thé EOC staff
members entered data from 500 polling stations which had
been gathered by more than 150 international observers who
had visited 115 constituencies. On 2 January they had all re-
ported back to the EOC for a debriefmg session. Expériences
were shared in small regional groups and in plenary discussions.
This qualitative information was added to the quantitative
analysis of thé observation forms. By 4 January, thé EOC
finalized its report on the overall conduct of the élections, in-
cluding information on serious irregularities. Graphs and tables
showing thé 107 over 103 victory for KANU were also included.
The final report was forwarded to thc DDDG missions. It
concluded that the EOC was of the opinion that the win by
Président Moi of thé presidential élection was, though at some
stages flawed, 'acceptable'. The most important conclusion,
however, was that in '5 per cent of the Parliamentary contests,
thé irregularities in thé poil and count were so gréât as to inval-
idate thé élections in thèse particular constituencies and, conse-
quently, thé legitimacy of the overall KANU majority in thé
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National Assembly'. According to the EOC in at least three
constituencies (Westlands, Kitui West and Changamwe) thé
^ count had been rigged in favour of KANU. In other words, the
Î07-103 majority should have been a 106-104 victory for
the opposition. A meeting with all ambassadors was held the
next day to discuss the report. It was agreed to follow up on
certain issues raised by the meeting, such as collecting inform-
• ation from domestic observers to verify and extend thé informa-
tion on a number of constituencies, which had been earmarked
as having suffered from 'serious irregularities'. On 8 January
. thé draft report was discussed with a core group of the DDDG.
Adjustments were made along thé Unes of editing the text to
tnaximize clarity, update or correct information on thé outcome
of thé élections and to rephrase thé text along more diplomatie
unes. For example, thé 'legitimacy' issue was dropped. Among
thé arguments used was the subjudice rule.9 Publication of the
report might interfère with coming pétitions by contenders
against thé outcome of thé élections. It was agreed that follow-
ing thé last type of adjustment the internai EOC report would
be turned into a DDDG report and should be named as such.
The EOC members finalized this version on 9 January and
handed it in to thé chair of the DDDG for distribution among
its members. It was hoped that in one week's time the report
could be made public. A small délégation of ambassadors would
visit thé Electoral Commission for this purpose as well. The
political parties were also earmarked as among thé likely
receivers of the report.
Most members of thé EOC left by thé middle of January. A
few stayed and continued gathering information from domestic
observers, journalists and représentatives of political parties,
churches and civic rights NGOs. A number of constituencies
were revisited again to do follow-up research to obtain more de-
tailed knowledge of thé élections. One major activity was the
screening of events in the Molo and Kilgoris constituencies.
fights had started in the Laikipia area, which had at a certain
stage an undeniable political character and had spread by
25 January to the Njoro area south of Nakuru in Molo con-
stituency. fights between Kalenjin and Kikuyu groups were wit-
nessed and taped on video. These findings were reported to the
international press, finally, by late January a third version of the
international observers' report was sent to all missions. This
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version had been slightly adjusted and the British High
Commission acted as chief editor. Except for a few lines with
références to thé 1992 élections, no essential changes had been
made to the version handed in by 9 January, The main change
was that recommendations to the ECK for coming élections
had become an intégral part of the report again. It seemed as if
thé report had simply been shelved. It took another two weeks
until thé report was made public and discussed in thé Kenyan
press on 15 February.
EVALUATION OF PERFORMED ACTIVITIES AND
SUGGESTIONS FOR IMPROVEMENT
The main aim of the Election Observation Centre was to facili-
tate and support thé observation of the 1997 Kenya élections
by thé diplomatie missions. In particular its task was to coordi-
nate thé élection observation by advising where, when and how
to observe thé élections.
The EOC performed all of thèse spécifie tasks requested by
thé DDDG. Throughout thé observation period thé missions
were provided with maps and constituency profiles with
information on candidates and spécifies of their constituen-
cies. Also, practical information was forwarded on accom-
modation and transport. The EOC frequently contacted (most
of) the political parties, individual politicians and domestic
observer organizations (the IED, NCCK and Catholic Justice
and Peace Commission, Kenya Human Rights Commission,
among others). For logistical matters the EOC contacted thé
Electoral Commission of Kenya (for example on provision of
thé Kenya Election Manual and thé location of polling
stations). It is thought that thé coordination of the missions'
activities resulted in better reporting and more knowledge
and understanding of thé Kenya 1997 élections as compared
to thé 1992 observation exercise. The idea to optimize thé
availability of manpower and fmancial means and to share
information gathered by thé individual missions to get de-
tailed and insight on thé préparation period for thé vote and
thé voting process on élection day itself materialized rather
well.
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Still, there is room for improvement. Among thé main prob-
lems experienced during the period of coordination and obser-
vation, two should be singled ouf.
a) problems within thé opérations of the Election Observation
Centre (internai problems);
b) problems outside thé opérations of the Election Observation
Centre (external problems).
It should be kept in mind that there is sometimes no clear-
cut division between thèse two types of problems. Also, one
should keep in mind that some of the problems experienced are
due completely to thé expérimental character of this project.
Problems in Relation to thé Opérations of the Election
Observation Centre
The mixed professional background of the EOC members (his-
torian, geographer, political scientist, human rights lawyer),
their knowledge of the country and its people, and expérience
in élection observation allowed for addressing the broad variety
of tasks needed to coordinate the observation activities. Still,
some issues need attention:
• The late announcement of élection day is considered to be a
major factor in frustrating a timely, clear and overall com-
prehensive start of the Election Observation Centre. The co-
ördinators arrived rather late and at separate moments.
• For a centre without an official overall leader, the Plan of
Action proved to be a very useful tooi. It showed in detail
deadlines to be matched, tasks to be performed and meet-
ings to attend. It assisted also in the communication
' between the coördinators, who at times themselves were out
in the field observing.
« A total of four people is not sufficient to run the EOC. There
is, in particular, tension between coordinating tasks and ob-
serving duties. In that sensé it should be mentioned that the
EOC profited very much from staff members that volun-
teered their services.
• In principle, the tasks within the Centre had been divided
between the coördinators on a regional basis. Yet, because
of lack of coördinators some areas were not specifically
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assigned (for example, Northern Rift and North of Eastern).
The initial idea to coordmate ail observations m one région
under one person did not materialize. In practice, it turned
out to be more effective to start from the perspective of
linking EOG staff to spécifie embassies. At certain moments
this meant that thé logistics workload prohibitcd a thorough
analysis of the élections.
• The political parties of Kenya are not well organized. As a
resuit, thé provision of information to thé missions by thé
EOC was seriously hampered and time consuming.
Campaign meetings in particular suffered a lack of detailed
information for observers because dates and venues were
either known very late or changed at the last moment.
Some recommendations on thé division of labour within thé
EOC are thé following:
• Timely arrangements should be made for recruitment of co-
ördinators and other members of staff;
• Preferably coördinators and staff members should hâve a
mixed professional background;
• Coördinators and staff members should be familiär with
Kenya and its politics;
• Coördinators should be stationed at the EOC office; modest
travelling is recommended;
• Budget for a personal assistant at the EOC to each coördina-
tor to share the workload. Having a good knowledge of
Kenya (its geography) and having a wide network of contacts
is an advantage in assuring the collection of up-to-date infor-
mation (logistics as well as content), especially for the more
remote areas. In this respect, a local assistant is very helpful;
• Lists of names and contact addresses of all local coördina-
tors should be made available to the EOC and vice versa.
Local observers should play a more profound rôle in indicat-
ing to the international observers certain hot-spot areas.
Problems in Relation to the Deployment of DDDG
Missions
First and foremost, note that elthough 22 missions and two in-
ternational organizations were united in one group of donors,
they still showed a broad diversity concerning:
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• (extra) financial means available;
• total personnel available;
• flexibility in supplying personnel;
• knowledge of Kenya and its politics;
• understanding of the (particularities of the) constitu-
ency représentation System (Westminster 'winner-takes-all'
System);
• dévotion and interest in careful observation;
• willingness to share information;
• involvement (otherwise) in thé élections (for example, sup-
porting domestic observers).
The above mix of characteristics results in a continuüm
whcre we find, on thé one extrême, countries that provide
financial means and many flexible, knowledgeable and devoted
persons, while on thé other extrême, missions that lack in all of
thèse aspects. In some cases, national law or politics appar-
ently prohibits a füll participation in thé diplomatie obser-
vation exercise (for example, France, UK and Germany). In
others, it is because thèse missions are small and/or not so
knowledgeable concerning Kenyan politics. With respect to a
lack of personnel we should mention that Denmark and
Norway were able to overcome thé rather limited size of their
embassy staff by providing international observers from their
countries. However, thé Scandinavian observers only arrived
some two weeks before the général élections.10 Finally, some
countries were to a larger extent involved in thé élection ob-
servation exercise because they financed most of the costs of
thé EOC (notably thé Danes, Swedes, Fmns, Swiss and Dutch
missions) or assisted by providing equipment and housing
(Japanese and Australians). Likewise, and even more costly,
some missions (Denmark, the Netherlands, Sweden and UK)
enabled the recruitment and training of the local observers by
providing US$1.5 million to three Kenyan NGOs (the National
Council of Churches of Kenya, the Catholic Justice and Peace
Commission, and the Institute for Education in Democracy).
finally, the UK was also involved in thé élections by way of
British companies providing ballot boxes and ballot papers. It
should be noted that this aspect resulted in the British High
Commission, in the view of some groups in Kenyan society,
being partisan on one side.
312 Election Observation and Démocratisation in Africa
The following observations have been made:
Flexibility in deployment of international observers is a nec-
essary precondition in a situation where the füll and constant
coverage of all constituencies is not possible. In the case of the
Kenya 1997 élections approximately 30 observers were avail-
able in the period up to élection day, 29 December. This means
that even if they were able to cover two constituencies at a
time, only about 30 per cent of the areas could be visited. By di-
recting observers to 'most-needed' venues the most effective
use is made of the manpower available and the quality of the
overall observation exercise can be enhanced. Some countries,
notably the Dutch, opted for a flexible attitude towards deploy-
ment of personnel. However, a flexible set-up of élection obser-
vation also brings along some disadvantages, for the mission
and for the EOC. The short intervals between party primaries,
nomination day, campaign period and the actual élection day,
and the préparations needed to guide the observers, call for a
fixed deployment schedule. When this is not possible or not
wanted, a disproportionate amount of time has to be devoted to
making last-minute enquiries and arrangements in practical
matters (transport, accommodation) and also regarding content
(up-to-date newspaper cuttings, copies of area profiles, former
observation reports, maps). The risk of such late arrangements
on the side of the diplomatic missions is that at the crucial last
moment transport and manpower are not available. Likewise,
for the EOC it means that fulfilling the above requirements
leaves less time for analysis of observation reports and getting/
keeping in close contact with political parties, media, local
groups, and so on.
As a result of this mixture in capabilities, attitudes and inter-
ests, especially in the period proceeding 29 December, only a
small core group of countries performed most of the observa-
tions. For example, campaign and nomination observations
were foremost left to UK, Denmark, Sweden, Canada and the
Netherlands. The latter country was at one time responsible for
one-third of all observers! In some respects this is the result of
some missions being rather small. On the other hand, a country
like the USA, having a hugc observing capacity, opted not to co-
operate closely with the EOC.
The mixed background of the DDDG missions also interfered
with the final phase of the élection observation: reporting.
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Regrettably, the final report provided to thé DDDG missions
took too long to be made public. The delay must have frus-
trated other missions, because according to information from
thé Daily Nation newspaper, one of the embassies had handed to
one of the Nation'^ reporters thé 'serious irregularities' docu-
ment. In thé end, thé delay in presenting the füll results of the
international élection observation backfired on the donor
Community, and on the British in particular (see for example,
Economie Review, 26 Jan. 1998: 24-6: 'Donor Conspiracy - Western
Gountries Opt to Hide Election Findings', and 23 Feb. 1998:
25-6: 'The Truth Is Out - Embassies of the Major Western
Donor Countries Altered International Observers' Report').
The following recommendations concerning the deployment
of DDDG missions could be made:
• Allocate one contact person plus one or two assistants at the
embassy.
• Provide in advance, and update constantly, an overview of
availability of personnel.
• Preferably locate diplomats in areas they are familiär with,
within a set-up that starts from a 'flexibility' approach.
• At mission level, there should be a sharing of information
by the diplomatic observers by exchanging copies of obser-
vation reports and/or small meetings before and after each
phase in the élections. Likewise, observers should contact
directly and share information with colleagues who visited
a constituency earlier or are very knowledgeable about the
area.
• Local observer groups have been of major assistance to the
EOC's activities in providing background data on spécifie
areas and people. These groups are capable of playing the
rôle of the memory of élection observation. Before the onset
of the élections they shared their expériences from the 1992
élections with the ever-rotating diplomats. Still, collabora-
tion between the two groups of observers should be im-
proved." Support to these groups should be part of any
observation exercise in Africa. Local capacity-building needs
to be among the first priorities.
• Make sure that embassies' means of transport are claimed in
advance irrespective of the destination and exact dates of
travel.
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' Deploy drivers in such a way that they are able to vote on
élection day in the constituency where they are registered.
• Discuss, check and counter-check the statements made in
the final report by the donor community. Be as sober as pos-
sible in claiming irregularities. Be careful in using informa-
tion, including élection results from the local newspapers.12
However, there is no need to use vague formulations out of
fear of interfering with possible élection pétitions. The sub
judice rule does not apply to the donor's report. Publication of
the report should not extend beyond a period of three weeks
after élection day, and should be made available to the
Kenyan public at large.
• In général, it is recommended that missions of former colo-
nial rulers should not head the donor community's observa-
tions. This, in particular, includes the writing up of the final
report. Likewise (private companies of) former colonial
rulers should be extremely reluctant to be involved in the
provision of ballot boxes and ballot papers. The reason is
that, notwithstanding the quality of the services provided
(for example, no mistakes on ballot papers), interested
groups will always point, rightly or wrongly, to the former
close links and potential interests of the former colonizing
country.
• It should be realized that in years to comc other diplomats
will be present at the foreign missions. To prépare these ob-
servers, a video was made for the Dutch Embassy showing,
among other things, the élection and count in Kajiado
Central Gonstituency. This video should be used in training
diplomats in coming élections.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion it must be stressed that the experiment of a new
model of international élection observation in Kenya has largely
been successful. The combination of a small group of profes-
sional, academie élection observation coördinators, most of
them Kenya specialist, and of having a large political network
built over many years, together with a large group of diplomatic
observers stationed in Kenya, having spécifie political and social
networks, was helpful in collecting detailed information on
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recent political developments there. It is important to realize
that no other model is able to provide this unique blend of
relevant information-gathering networks.13
In short, thé main positive aspects of thé Kenyan 'EOC-
diplomats' model are:
• Diplomats are familiär with the area, the population and
politics of the country.
• The use of diplomats as international observers is very cost
efficient. In some respects it is part of their daily job, while
others spend their free time. The EOC running costs are
estimated at US$30,000 (excluding salaries/DSA of the
coördinators).
• Election observation is donc over a long period, allowing for
a better understanding of thé élection process itself as well
as further enhancing thé diplomats knowledge of Kenya.
• Coopération and sharing of information between diplomatie
missions as well as with Kenyan society at large (political
parties, NGOs, clergy) is strengthened and might also con-
tribute to a better knowledge of the country.
• The unified and coordinated observation exercise resulls in a
single donor observation report. This enhances chances of
their voice being heard and appropriate action taken by ail
parties involved.
Négative outcomes of the experiment are:
• Too large a variety in attitudes of embassies towards the ob-
servation of thé élections. In thé end it ail cornes down to
the interest shown and time and energy devoted by thé local
diplomats in thé élection observation exercise.
• Too long a delay in publishing thé final report. This created
irritation between diplomatie missions and, in thé end, re-
sulted in two versions circulating in thé Kenyan press. This
is likely to be (mis)interpreted by thé Kenyan public.
Among thé main objections made to diplomats is that they
are not willing to speak out clearly and loudly if irregularities
are observed. One should, however, realize that the group of
diplomats is diverse. The Kenyan experiment has shown that as
a resuit it is most unlikely that thé final verdict will not be
made public. In thé group of foreign missions some will not
allow this to happen. Moreover, the group of coördinators and
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thé domestic observers also act as a kind of watchdog. finally,
some of the negative aspects of the model can be overcome in
time, while the advantages far outweigh the possible problems.
Therefore, Implementation of this model of élection observa-
tion in other African countries is sincerely recommended. A
prerequisite is complementary assistance in the recruitment
and training of domestic observers. A nation-wide coverage of
polling stations by domestic observer groups is an integral
element of the new model.
In summary, the new approach of élection observation by diplo-
mats in collaboration with a group of professional coördinators
is more cost efficiënt, sustainable and proficient than the old
model of flying in élection observers from abroad.14first, diplo-
mats remain in the country and continue to meet, discuss and
make policies relevant to the host country. This will in the short
and middle run strengthen the consistcncy of the Western
donors' reactions to the process of democratization: the donors'
'memory' is more profoundly present for the government of the
host country. Second, contacts between the diplomatic commu-
nity, civil society and political parties (opposition and govern-
ment alike) will be intensified. Third, support to domestic
observer groups allows for the existence and further develop-
ment of a source of information on local politics and élection
observation. This local 'memory' is also of major importance in
préparations for coming élections.
To some countries (host and observing alike) this might be a
less welcome scenario.15 As a code of conduct for the host
country it should allow resident diplomats to observe the élec-
tions, while observing countries should likewise refrain from
flying in observers from abroad. This scenario should only be
employed as a last option if an insufficient number of local
diplomats are available to observe the élections in a substantial
and profound way. These observers, who should all have a good
knowledge of local politics, should follow the instructions and
guidelines explained in training sessions set out by the coordi-
nating Election Observation Centre. Thcy should report to the
EOC, and refrain from individual statements.
I strongly believe that under the old model chances of legit-
imizing fraudulent élections are higher. As a result, this ap-
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proach should be abandoned altogether. The new model should
become an esscntial element of the new code of conduct for
élection observation, to an extent that failure to implement it
renders, at beforehand, any élection 'not free and fair'.
NOTES
I am grateful to Mr N. Braakhuis and Dr F. Grignon for information and com-
ments on a draft version of this chapter.
1. DDDG members are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Czech
Republic, Denmark, finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy,
Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Sweden,
Switzerland, United Kingdom, United States, European Union and
UNDP.
2. The staff members of the EOC consisted of four coördinators:
Dr Judith Geist (USAID), Prof. Palle Svensson (Denmark - Aarhus
University), Dr David Throup (British Foreign Office) and Dr Marcel
Rutten (Netherlands — ASC). In addition, full-time assistance was pro-
vided by Ms. Catherine Duhamel (Canada) and Ms. Sabitha Raju (UK),
while Dr François Grignon (France - IFRA), Mr Charles Hornsby (UK
- Shell), Mr Peter Njenga (Kenya - SNV) and Mr Ralph Peters
(Germany) contributed to the EOC's opérations for short periods.
Overall logistics and financial management was in the hands of
Mrs Laurie Rees (UK).
3. The legal parameter^ required that parhament be dissolved no later
than 25 January 1998 and an élection held within 90 days.
4 The British, after some hésitation because of directions from the
London office, joined later. They realized that USAID and the EU polit-
ical counsellors in Nairobi were serious with their ideas of a jomtly
funded Election Observation Centre, and delegated Mr David Throup,
a Foreign Office-employed scholar who speciahzes on Kenya and élec-
tions in Africa, to the secrétariat, as well as Ms. Laune Rees as office
manager. No direct British funds were made available, however, as they
optcd to finance local observer groups only.
5. See, for example, Kenya Human Rights Commission, Kayas of
Depnvation, Kayas ofBlood — Violence, Ethnicity and thé State in Coastal Kenya
(Nairobi 1997).
6. In addition, Dr François Grignon (France - IFRA) should be men-
tioned, who assisted Palle Svensson m coordinatmg efforts in
Ukamabam. He also made available detailed maps of the constituen-
cies. Mr Charles Hornsby, a former aide to David Throup in 1992, had
corne from Ghana to assist thé EOC during thé last week of Decembet
and early days of January 1998. He assisted in analysing élection results
by thé provision of figures showing turn-out, presidential and
parliamentary results per province, and thé hkc. David Throup (by
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interviewing Paul Muite) and Marcel Rutten (meetings with Richard
Lcakey) did mformation-gathcrmg fiorn Safina. Rut ten also was m
close contact with Ford-K politicians and activists.
7. These problems were particularly acute in the local government élec-
tions but affected some parliamentary and presidential poils as well. In
some polling stations ballot books were not delivcred, or the names of
candidates and symbols of political parties were missing or wrongly
printed.
8. It is also noteworthy that thé resuit announced by thé returning officer,
18,590 for KANU against 17,721 for DP, which was also broadcast on
radio and appeared in the print media, conflicted with the resuit en-
dorsed by ail opposition parties and observers (17,829 for DP against
17,790 for KANU) as well as with thé officiai resuit published by thé
Electoral Commission of Kenya of 17,882 (KANU) to 17,877 (DP).
9. The term sub judice literally means 'under judicial considération'.
Derived from it is the Sub Judice Rule: It is undoubted law that, when
litigation is pending and actively in suit before thé court, no one shall
comment on it in such a way that there is a real and substantial danger
of préjudice to thé trial of the action (see Nowrojee 1997: 1).
10. In many constituencies, indeed, in perhaps two-thirds, the party
primary is as, if not even more, important than the général élection in
selecting Kenya's future Members of Parliament and local councillors.
In that respect, we need to conclude that thé présence of international
observers was very crucial. However, reasoning from thé same argu-
ment, thé number of international observers during thèse days should
be further increased in coming élections.
This remark is made notwithstanding the fact that the domestic ob-
servers made premature statements on the 'free and fairness' of the
élections. At the same moment problems came to a head in Westlands,
the domestic observers gave a press conference some 500 mètres from
the Westlands Counting hall, declaring that 'the results do on the
whole reflect the wishes of the Kenyan voters'. This also increased ten-
sions betwcen and within the three participating organizations, the
IED, CJPC and NCCK.
In the initial analysis based on élection results published in the local
daily newspapers it seemed as if there were an above 100 per cent turn-
out in Molo Constituency. Later it became clear that the Molo number
of registered voters had been interchanged with the one of Kuresoi.
Likewise, the total number of votes cast and the number of valid votes
were sometimes mixed up in the daily newspapers. This interfères espe-
cially with the analysis of the number of votes cast for the presidency as
compared to those cast for the parliamentary élection, finally, the
official figures of the Electoral Commission of Kenya also have to be
checked carefully. For example, in the Presidenlial Results per
Constituency overview published on 14 January the figures for Kipipiri
are the ones of Maragwa. These figures now suggest a turn-out of
105.87 per cent. Also, the results for Moi and Ngilu in Yata
Constituency have been interchanged to the detriment of the latter.
(Political) diplomats have contacts with journalists, politicians, human
rights groups, intei national donors, and the like. This amounts to an
11.
12.
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14.
up-to-date package of views and relevant information which aids pro-
found understandmg of thé pohlics and main issues at stake, and is
helpful in streamlming thé élection observation exercise.
The call to do away with élection tourism and for a large and well-
trained group of international observers can be heard nowadays. Yet it
is my opinion that a group of some 100 professional international ob-
servers, moving from one élection to another, will not be able to form
detailed and up-to-date local contacts and obtain spécifie country
knowledge. This model cannot offer the same quality of observation.
Even more importantly, this model will not be able to provide hands for
a follow-up to the strengthening of the democratization process, as thé
mix of local diplomals and a small group of country specialist co-
ördinators would.
15. While observing in Narok District a local MP candidate and incumbent
Minister of thé Cabinet told two local observers that 'if it was to him
they would not be allowed to observe thé élections'. Likewise, thé
Kenyan government did not allow résident diplomats to observe thé
1992 élections (see Geisler 1993: 614).
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